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Reduced travel time, regional cohesion, economic development, and 
environmental benefits were some of the reasons given to develop a 
high-speed rail (HSR) network in Spain. Since the first high-speed line 
in Spain opened in 1992, HSR has been a part of the travel experience, 
despite recent concerns raised about the lack of demand and low occu-
pancy rates of HSR trains compared with those in other countries. In 
February 2013, Renfe Operadora, Spain’s state-owned transport com-
pany, implemented a new pricing scheme, which reduced ticket prices 
by at least 11% and introduced flexibility in their purchase. In this 
research, the effects of the new scheme were analyzed, and the impact 
on the shift in transport modes was substantiated through consideration 
of a discrete choice model. As a consequence of this policy, occupancy 
rates were increased hugely. Although apparently ticket price was not 
regarded by users as the main reason to travel by HSR, the price elasticity 
of demand turned out to be high. Given the transport modes that com-
peted with HSR, the effects were quite different. For short routes connect-
ing small- and medium-sized cities with big metropolitan areas, growth in 
demand was achieved at the expense of the car and the bus, whereas for 
long routes connecting large cities in which air transport was available, the 
growth occurred mainly at the expense of air transportation, and induced 
demand also was triggered. Finally, when the owner of the infrastructure 
and the train operating companies were managed by the government, the 
rail infrastructure fee policy set may have prompted unfair competition 
with other transport modes.
High-speed rail (HSR) has been the means of transportation in 
which the Government of Spain has invested the most by far: more 
than €45 billion over the past two decades. The first HSR line in the 
country was inaugurated in 1992 and linked Madrid with Seville, 
the country’s fourth largest city. Seville had been elected to host the 
1992 Expo World’s Fair and, through this investment, the economy 
of Spain’s southern region was expected to be stimulated. After the 
first project, Spain continued to build new HSR lines and now has 
the largest HSR network in Europe. With 3,100 km in service—
which is expected to grow to 5,000 km in the near future—Spain’s 
network is the second largest in the world after China’s.
The HSR lines in Spain, known as Alta Velocidad Española (AVE), 
are prestigious. Because the punctuality of the trains is almost 99%, 
the lines have helped to promote regional cohesion and economic 
development and to provide an environmentally friendly transport 
mode. As an indication of the remarkable know-how and experience 
gained from the development of Spain’s HSR, a consortium headed 
by Spanish companies, in conjunction with two Saudi Arabian com-
panies (88% of whose shareholders are Spanish), was selected to 
undertake an investment of about �7 billion in the high-speed (HS) 
trains and superstructures from Medina, Saudi Arabia, to Mecca, 
Saudi Arabia.
However, HSR also has its disadvantages, such as the huge invest-
ment necessary to build the infrastructure, the high maintenance 
costs, and the low demand in many corridors that can make it dif-
ficult to justify some lines from a socioeconomic point of view (1). 
In fact, according to the Spanish Minister of Transport, some of the 
lines in Spain had an occupancy rate below 50% in 2012 (2). By the 
beginning of 2013, the Spanish government decided to implement 
a more flexible pricing policy, as well as an overall price reduction 
for every kind of ticket, aimed at improving the occupancy rate of 
HS trains. This pricing scheme was similar to the yield management 
technique used for airplanes, which sets the price depending on the 
hour of the day, the category of the user (e.g., first class, tourist), the 
demand expected, and how far in advance the booking is made (3).
The goal of the study reported in this paper was to examine the 
effects that the reduction in prices had on HSR demand and, where 
possible, on the Spanish transport system. The remainder of this 
paper is organized as follows. The second section provides a review 
of the literature on aspects that influence the demand for HSR com-
pared with that of other transport modes. The third section describes 
and analyzes a case study of the Spanish HSR pricing policy, includ-
ing a discrete choice model developed on the basis of a survey con-
ducted in 2014 to substantiate the results. Finally, the fourth section 
discusses the key findings from this analysis and points out potential 
policy implications.
Literature review
It is broadly acknowledged that HS trains run at a speed above 
250 km/h to offer high capacity and, in some corridors, high frequency. 
HSR also is regarded as an environmentally friendly alternative to 
travel by air and by car to reach destinations within a medium-range 
distance. Albalate and Bel found the distance between the railway 
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nodes to be a key factor that influenced success (4). In addition, HSR 
can replace conventional railway trains in corridors in which higher 
capacity and less travel time is needed, which improves the railway 
service, even at the expense of other modes for which HSR is sub-
stituted. Nevertheless, some researchers have pointed out that the 
investment in HSR is high and cannot be justified on the basis of its 
economic benefits, because they are not certain (5), even though HSR 
has been shown to produce good economic returns in some instances 
and in rare cases could even be commercially viable (6). Indeed, de Rus 
confirmed that significant demand was needed to justify investment in 
HSR from the perspective of cost–benefit analysis (7). In the case of 
Spain, spatial equity was the main reason to promote HSR. In 2005, 
the president of the government declared that all capitals of Spain’s 
provinces should be linked by HSR so that travel times would be no 
longer than 4 h from the country’s capital, Madrid. Unfortunately, no 
debate occurred on the political scene about the social return on HSR 
investment, because HSR was considered a symbol of modernity, 
enjoyed the support of the public, and tickets were subsidized (8). 
The consensus was that the government should avoid excess charges, 
which could reduce the social benefits of a new HSR line through a 
reduction in traffic and a smaller market share than air transportation 
(9). In the United Kingdom, despite huge transport benefits to accrue 
mainly to existing and future rail users, a subsidy from the govern-
ment would be needed in addition to the HSR’s planned coverage 
of operating and maintenance costs (10). The development of a new 
HSR line also may be an opportunity to improve decision-making 
processes, not only for railway infrastructure but for every kind of 
transport infrastructure (11).
The academic literature on HSR is vast and diverse. Generally 
speaking, studies about the effects of HSR can be divided between 
ex ante and ex post interventions. The first group of studies was quite 
optimistic, whereas the second group identified benefits and costs in 
a more realistic manner (12). The gains from HSR were larger in the 
first cities to be connected, but some small cities also experienced 
important transformations, particularly in cases in which additional 
investments from the public sector were implemented. However, 
Monzón et al. remarked that the accessibility gains were more notable 
in urban areas with an HSR station, while other locations received 
limited benefit (i.e., the bypass problem), and therefore spatial equity 
issues could arise (13). To avoid such imbalances, Bröcker et al. 
recommended consideration of network efficiency and spatial 
equity issues in the HSR planning process (14). In other words, the 
benefits from HSR are not universal and depend on the case study, 
because transport is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
development of cities (15).
Competition between HSR and other transport modes, particu-
larly air transport, has also been studied widely. Strong competition 
between air transport and HSR was found to occur on routes with dis-
tances up to 1,000 km (16), but was most likely to occur between 400 
and 800 km (17). Several parameters are important in the assessment 
of competition. For instance, Dobruszkes found that, in addition to 
travel time, other variables may affect competition, including frequen-
cies, fares, airline hubs, and geographical structures of urban regions 
(18). Pagliara et al. noted that prices and frequency were among the 
most important variables to explain HSR demand from competing 
modes, and check-in and security controls negatively affected airplane 
demand (19). For the London–Paris route, travel time and frequency 
were found to be the two main keys of travel behavior (20).
Clewlow et al. found that improvements in HSR travel time led to 
a reduction in short-distance air trips (21). In addition, urban struc-
tures were shown to have an important influence on modal share. 
Albalate et al. found a reduction in the number of seats offered by 
airlines, albeit flight frequencies were not expected to undergo a 
significant reduction (i.e., switch to smaller planes) (22). Rail–air 
agreements also can bring commercial and environmental benefits, 
but under some circumstances the agreements can raise competition 
concerns from a legal perspective (23).
The role that HSR plays in tourism has been studied, with some 
differences found across European capitals. Whereas HSR was con-
sidered one of the reasons that tourists visited Paris, its presence 
did not have the same effect either in Madrid or in Rome (24, 25). 
Competition between HSR and conventional trains was analyzed in 
Taiwan, where the pricing strategy was a determinant factor in profit 
and welfare (26).
Usually, HSR is highly regulated and, unlike airlines, price dis-
crimination is hardly ever practiced (Eurostar and the current com-
petitive situation in Italy are exceptions). Given that profile, Yang 
and Zhang developed a model that assumed that airlines aimed to 
maximize their profit, while HSR aimed to maximize a weighted sum 
of profit and social welfare (27). The profit of air transport was found 
to be higher under price discrimination than with uniform pricing, 
whereas the profit for HSR remained unchanged, even though the 
welfare could vary. In research conducted in the United Kingdom, 
Harvey et al. found that willingness to pay for travel time reductions 
also was related to prestige and comfort (28).
With respect to ticketing preference, Cheng and Huang found 
that perceived benefits, perceived sacrifice, and perceived ease of 
use were critical factors that influenced passengers’ retail channel 
preference (29). Moreover, they also found differences with respect 
to demographic factors, trip characteristics, and how far in advance 
the ticket was bought.
Finally, all over Europe, railway infrastructure belongs to the gov-
ernment, and the service is provided mostly by public companies, 
which have to pay an annual fee to use the railway track. According to 
the European regulation (i.e., Fourth Package), railway infrastructure 
should be opened to all qualified operators in the near future. Thus, 
train operating companies are looking for decision-support tools 
in the areas of pricing, yield management, schedule planning, and 
control to capture new users or retain existing ones (30).
For instance in April 2012, Italy adopted the European regulation 
with an increase in HSR demand and train supply, albeit the results 
for the private operator were not so positive (31). The recent pricing 
experience in Spain appears to be an important example of yield 
management in HSR and thus constitutes a case study of interest 
to policy makers and regions about new HSR developments. The 
main objective of the research reported here was to analyze this case 
study and to explain the impacts of the new pricing policy on other 
transport modes and on HSR demand. Therefore, transport demand 
was studied in some corridors with HSR, and a discrete choice model 
was developed to focus on the reasons that users chose HSR and the 
price elasticity of demand.
CaSe Study
Passenger transport in Spain
Domestic passenger transport in Spain is dominated by the road 
mode, with more than 90% of the share over the past 5 years. This 
high value was encouraged by the vast highway network developed 
over the past two decades. In 2013, Spain had 15,100 km (7,007 mi) 
of modern high-capacity roads (32). The role of road transport in 
the international market (i.e., travelers from abroad) has become 
less important in recent years, and decreased from a share of 51% 
to 44%, while air transport increased from 46% to 53%.
Rail and air transportation have not been able to threaten the domi-
nance of the road for domestic transport use, despite the fact that 
passenger rail share slightly increased from 5.2% in 2009 to 6.0% in 
2013. Inland waterway transportation within Spain is low compared 
with that of other countries in the European Union. Rail transporta-
tion plays an almost negligible role at the international level (less than 
0.2%). Thus the goal of HSR investment in Spain was not to turn the 
Spanish transport modal share inside out, but rather to change the 
modal share in specific, point-to-point relationships.
HSr transport System in Spain
After Spain joined the European Union in 1986, it took advantage 
of European funds and its own economic growth to develop an HSR 
network. Indeed, in 1987 the country’s railway transport planners 
considered an increase in maximum rail speed from 160 to 220 km/h 
and, in 1988, the government resolved to build the first HSR line 
(Madrid to Seville).
This first HSR line was constructed according to the technical 
standards of the French high-speed network (i.e., Train à Grande 
Vitesse) with a gage of 1,435 mm. The line entered into service 
in April 1992 and initially linked Madrid and Seville with a travel 
time of 2 h and 55 min rather than the 7 h formerly required. The 
infrastructure also connected the intermediate cities of Ciudad Real, 
Puertollano, and Cordoba. One year later, the commercial speed was 
increased up to 300 km/h, and the travel time was reduced to less 
than 2 h and 30 min. The effects on the transport system on that cor-
ridor were large: the share of train use rose from 14% to more than 
43%, mainly at the expense of the airplane, and through the capture 
of additional users as well (33). The next step in the HSR network was 
to connect Madrid with Barcelona, the second largest city in Spain, 
located in the northeast corridor. The construction of two HSR lines, 
which consisted of Madrid–Zaragoza–Barcelona–French border and 
of Madrid–Valladolid, began in 1997 and 2002, respectively.
In 2003, the Madrid–Zaragoza stretch was opened at a reduced 
speed of 200 km/h because of the lack of the European signaling sys-
tem, known by its acronym ERTMS. In 2006, with the ERTMS, the 
commercial speed was increased to 250 km/h. Only 1 year later, in 
August 2007, there was a new increment to 300 km/h. By the end of 
that year, two new stretches entered into service: Madrid–Valladolid 
and Cordoba–Malaga in the northwest and southern corridor, respec-
tively. In February 2008, HSR between Madrid and Barcelona was 
inaugurated. Again, the effect on competition with the airlines was 
enormous. HSR increased the market share of trains on that route 
from 12% to 47%, and reduced the share of the airlines to 53%. In 
December 2010, the connection between Madrid and Valencia, the 
third most populous city in Spain, entered into service, with a reduc-
tion in travel time by train from 7 h to 1 h and 35 min. In this origin–
destination pair, the modal share of the train grew from 12% to 46%. 
The share of air and bus transportation went down from 17.4% and 
9.2% to 2.6% and 3.1%, respectively. This HSR line also connected 
small cities such as Cuenca and Albacete to Madrid. Finally, in 
2011, the speed for the Madrid–Barcelona segment was increased 
to 310 km/h. Other milestones were added after 2011, such as the 
Albacete–Alicante stretch, which opened in June 2013. However, 
for the purpose of this research, the focus was on the main lines and 
cities shown in Figure 1, given that the new pricing scheme was 
approved in February 2013, and therefore no data were available to 
compare the effect of the new ticket price with the previous situation 
on the new lines.
By 2012, 20 years after the inauguration of the first HSR line, more 
than 300 HS trains ran every day on Spanish HSR tracks, served 
nearly 100,000 passengers, and reached 80 Spanish municipalities.
New Pricing Scheme and demand 
analysis in HSr Corridors
In Spain, Renfe Operadora is the public transport operator company, 
and ADIF is the public company that owns and manages the HSR 
network. At the inception of HSR, Renfe Operadora set fixed prices, 
which depended only on the class and type of train. Discount prices 
were implemented years later, but the approach was still far away 
from the yield management pricing techniques used by airlines (3). 
Renfe Operadora wanted to go further. In February 2013, it introduced 
more flexibility as well as generalized ticket price reductions aimed at 
improving the occupancy rate of HS trains. The main characteristics 
of the plan can be summarized as follows:
• Average reduction of single ticket price by 11%. If the trip was
longer than 650 km, the reduction was even greater. This reduction 
applied to HS trains without the category of public service (i.e., Alvia 
train at 250 km/h, AVE train above 300 km/h). The AVANT trains 
under public service were cheaper, because they received a subsidy, 
and their maximum speed was 250 km/h.
• Promotional ticket with a reduction up to 70% of the single
ticket price. The discount depended on the expected demand and 
how far in advance the booking was made. The main disadvantage 
of this ticket was that cancellations and changes were allowed but at 
a higher price than in other categories. This tariff was similar but not 
the same as the yield management technique used by airlines. Prices 
changed on a daily basis. Thus this approach was not as dynamic as 
that of airline tickets. Moreover, when a season peak was expected, 
Renfe Operadora usually launched special promotions with a high 
number of tickets that fell within this category.
• Bonus for 10 trips between two cities, which could be used
within 4 months after acquisition. The discount applied was 35% 
with respect to the single ticket price.
• Annual youth card for people between 14 and 26 years of age.
Discounts above 30% of the single ticket price were offered.
• As in previous years, return trips were discounted at 20% of
the single ticket price.
One of the reasons why Renfe Operadora is so popular with its 
users is its commitment to punctuality, implemented at the very 
beginning of HSR. If a train arrives 15 min late, Renfe Operadora will 
reimburse 50% of the ticket price. If the delay is more than 30 min, 
Renfe Operadora will reimburse the whole ticket price. This commit-
ment is even more stringent on the first line (i.e., Madrid–Seville) on 
which the reimbursement of the whole ticket is triggered by a delay 
of more than 5 min.
Although the Spanish gross domestic product went down by 0.8% 
the year after the introduction of the new pricing scheme, revenue 
increased by 6.7%, and the average occupancy rate of HS trains 
rose from 66% to 74.3%. Thus Renfe Operadora met its initial objec-
tive to boost demand and increase travelers by train. The results for 
the main lines are summarized in Table 1.
FIGURE 1  HSR corridors.
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TABLE 1  HSR and Airplane Demand Changes After 1 Year of New Pricing Scheme
Corridor Services
Surface 
Distance (km)
HSR Demand 
Variation (%)
Airplane Demand 
Variation (%)
Northeast Madrid–Barcelona (B, C, A) 621 +16.0 −14
Madrid–Zaragoza (B, C) 307 +10.0 na
Zaragoza–Barcelona (B, C) 314 +9.6 na
South Madrid–Seville (B, C, A) 472 +8.2 −32
Madrid–Cordoba (B, C) 344 +9.0 na
Madrid–Malaga (B, C, A) 500 +9.5 −30.7
Madrid–Toledo Madrid–Toledo (B, C)a 80 −1.2 na
Northwest Madrid–Segovia (B, C)a 90 −4.8 na
Madrid–Valladolid (B, C)a 190 −3.4 na
West Madrid–Valencia (B, C, A) 400 +7.4 −3.7
Madrid–Cuenca (B, C) 195 +12.0 na
Madrid–Albacete (B, C) 321 +19.2 na
Long-distance Barcelona–Seville (C, A) 1,093 +88.0 −18
 journeys Barcelona–Malaga (C, A) 1,121 +47.0 −22.7
Note: B, C, A = bus, car, and air transportation available; B, C = bus and car transportation available; na = not 
applicable.
aAVANT trains are available.
Two main conclusions arise from Table 1. First, growth in demand 
was outstanding. Second, this increase differed across origin– 
destination pairs. Therefore, the trips were classified according to the 
distance traveled and the competing transport modes, as described in 
the sections that follow.
Distances Less Than 100 km
In this kind of corridor, three transport modes competed: bus, HSR, 
and car. The route linked small and big cities, and the total travel 
time usually was less than 1 h. The two origin–destination pairs 
in this category were Madrid–Segovia and Madrid–Toledo. Many 
users of these routes either were commuters, who lived outside 
Madrid but worked in Madrid, or they were tourists. The pricing 
scheme was not reflected in an appreciable way, because most 
of these users were eligible to take the public service trains (i.e., 
AVANT trains), which always charged the same, cheaper price. In 
Segovia, a shift occurred from use of the AVE and Alvia trains to 
use of the AVANT trains, which had a total growth in the corridor 
of about 2%. In Toledo, only AVANT trains were available. The 
economies of Segovia and Toledo depend heavily on tourism. Thus 
the difference in the train demand growth could be explained by rev-
enue per available room, which decreased in Toledo by 10.9% and 
increased in Segovia by 4.4%. In other words, the price elasticity of 
this kind of corridor was low, and trips relied greatly on growth in 
the gross domestic product.
Distances Between 150 and 400 km 
Without Airplanes
This kind of corridor linked small and medium-sized cities, with the 
exception of Zaragoza, which was a medium-to-large city of about 
650 thousand inhabitants. Again, three transport modes—bus, car, 
and HSR—competed for passengers. The reduction in use of the 
Madrid–Valladolid route was a result of the AVANT trains in the cor-
ridor. As with Segovia, a shift in use from AVE and Alvia to AVANT 
trains occurred, whose use grew by 2.5%, while total growth in the 
corridor was 0.5%. In fact, since the introduction of AVANT trains 
in 2009, this shift has continued at a steady pace. Thus in corridors 
in which public service was available, the reduction of ticket prices 
seemed to be negligible, because users tended to prefer to travel on 
the public service trains, given their cheaper and invariable price. 
Travel time on AVANT trains was only 5 min longer than it was on 
AVE trains, and it was the same as it was on the Alvia trains.
The huge growth in the use of the Albacete–Madrid trip route 
could have been influenced by the fact that other kinds of trains from 
Madrid offered a longer distance and travel time at a cheaper price 
were still running, and therefore a shift of users from those trains 
could have occurred. With respect to the other modes, HSR growth 
in this corridor was at the expense of car and bus users. No additional 
demand was recorded in these corridors.
Distances Beyond 350 km with Airplanes
This kind of corridor connected large cities with metropolitan areas 
with more than 1.5 million inhabitants. In these origin–destination 
pairs, HSR mostly competed with air transportation. With respect 
to the rail–air market alone, the share of HS trains was about 80%, 
while the share of airplanes was about 20%. The ticket price reduction 
increased the share of HS trains, reduced the share of air transportation, 
and prompted induced demand in the corridor.
The Madrid–Barcelona corridor opened in 2008, and competition 
between air and AVE has been fierce ever since. In 2012, HSR trans-
ported more users than airplanes did (2.688 million users versus 
2.573 million users). The growth of AVE demand in the Madrid– 
Barcelona corridor was mainly at the expense of airplane use, while 
new users also were induced. Whereas travel by car and bus went 
down slightly by 1.2% and 3%, after the yield management price was 
implemented, it did not have the same effect on airplane and HSR 
travel. HSR use increased by 16%, while airplane use decreased by 
14%. Despite the economic recession, the total travelers in the corridor 
increased by 0.5%. This kind of corridor was the only one in which, 
despite the economic recession, overall demand ultimately grew.
Long-Distance Journeys
For the two trips in this category, the in-vehicle travel time by air-
plane was about 1 h and 30 min, whereas by HSR it was 5 h and 
30 min. The effect of the new pricing scheme was enormous, given 
that the huge increase in demand was at the expense of airlines. In 
this case the total demand in the corridor went down substantially.
As explained, the pricing scheme had a huge impact on other trans-
portation modes. In particular, the airplane and the bus endured a 
decline from the shift in passengers to HSR and from the economic 
downturn. In fact, in some corridors HS trains were found to be 
cheaper than bus service. After a complaint made by bus companies, 
which were subject to taxes and special fees, and several conversa-
tions with air companies (34), Renfe Operadora decided to keep the 
same prices as in the previous year to fairly compete with other trans-
portation modes (35). Indeed, the Spanish Court of Auditors recog-
nized that the annual fees paid by Renfe Operadora to ADIF covered 
only about 50% of total infrastructure cost, albeit maintenance costs 
were covered completely.
effects of yield Management Pricing Policy
Methodology
The study of the choices that consumers make when confronted with 
alternatives is of the utmost importance. In the transportation field, 
the individual preferences of consumers, and the distribution of 
these preferences across the population, have been widely taken 
into account through the consideration of discrete choice models.
Discrete choice models have been developed and applied in dis-
aggregated analysis of travel choice behavior since the beginning of 
the 1970s. In fact, progress toward a better understanding of trans-
portation mode choice was made by several researchers, such as 
Domencich and McFadden (36) and McFadden (37). As a result, 
discrete choice models have been applied to describe the behav-
ior of consumers when faced with a variety of mutually exclusive 
choices (38).
Discrete choice modeling assumes that the utility of each alterna-
tive is probabilistic, with error terms that follow the Gumbel distri-
bution. The best-known probabilistic discrete choice model is the 
logit model, because it provides a convenient representation of the 
degree of heterogeneity of consumer tastes of the existing mod-
els of product differentiation. As pointed out, the underlying force 
that drives implementation of a yield management pricing policy 
in the context of demand levels is the price. This section examines 
through a discrete choice modeling to what extent the new pricing 
policy implemented made a difference in the HSR passenger transport 
segment.
Revealed and Stated Preferences Surveys
To meet the objectives of this research, a comprehensive database 
needed to be developed. Two types of data collection were con-
ducted to identify (a) why certain choices were made by travelers 
through revealed preference (RP) surveys and (b) how respondents’ 
choices varied under different hypothetical situations through stated 
preference (SP) analyses.
As part of a research project developed in 2014, a survey was 
conducted to determine the reasons why passengers made their 
journey (e.g., origin, destination, travel time, cost, income), and 
to understand through SP surveys the relative importance assigned 
by travelers to various characteristics of their journey (e.g., cost to 
change the transport mode they used). The survey was conducted at 
the Atocha HSR station in Madrid, the main HSR station in Spain. 
It was conducted face-to-face with a questionnaire that elicited RP 
and SP responses.
Respondents used a paper questionnaire tailored to better adhere 
to the evidence of actual market behavior (i.e., HSR services), and 
the hypothesized scenarios. The first part of the questionnaire asked the 
respondents to describe their RP preferences, taking into account the 
current journey, and included questions on the following: (a) jour-
ney origin and destination, (b) journey purpose, (c) journey duration, 
(d) whether the respondent was traveling alone, (e) type of ticket the 
respondent traveled on, ( f ) who was paying for the journey, (g) jour-
ney cost, and (h) respondent’s socioeconomic profile (income). The 
second part of the questionnaire was the SP exercise. A hypothetical 
cost scheme was briefly introduced, and the respondents were asked 
if they would choose another mode and which costs would influence 
their decisions. The cost variable varied across four levels, and those 
values were the same regardless of the HSR service evaluated.
The RP and SP surveys were conducted in March 2014. Of these, 
220 completed RP and SP interviews focused exclusively on HSR 
travelers, with men (61%) and women (39%) chosen randomly. 
The key outputs of each trip maker were the following: the main 
socioeconomic characteristics showed that 61% of the respondents 
earned more than €1,000 per month. Users between 25 and 50 years 
old were represented the most. Forty percent of the users in the 
sample were singles, while 60% had partners. Most respondents 
(55% of the sample) traveled with someone (i.e., with a partner or 
relatives), while 45% traveled alone. Fifty percent had a university 
degree. The sample mainly comprised employees (62%), with lower 
percentages of students (18%). For 16% of the sample, income was 
higher than €2,500 per month, while income was lower than €500 
per month for 28% of the travelers. Finally, the three most important 
reasons that respondents chose HSR were the speed of the trip by 
train, comfort, and frequency.
With respect to journey characteristics (i.e., door-to-door), the 
survey results showed that HSR was the mode that required the 
least travel time, followed by air transport. The third shortest travel 
time was by car, while the coach (i.e., bus) required the longest 
travel time.
Although the interviews were designed to yield a higher response 
rate to ensure more accurate results, the respondents who provided 
data were a representative sample of the population that used HSR 
lines as described. The interviews did not allow for other analyses 
(e.g., of purpose, income, conventional intercity rail).
Logit Model Development for HSR Service Choice
A logit model was selected to assess strategic key variables to explain 
the HSR choice (e.g., price, travel time, income). The logit model 
predicted the choice among possible transportation mode alterna-
tives and took into account data from each choice obtained from the 
survey described. The logit model considers the utility function in 
two parts: the part known is defined over observable characteristics 
V jm, and the other part ε jm being the differences of members of the 
subpopulation (Equation 1).
U Vjm jm jm= + ε (1)
where
 U = person’s utility,
 m = decision maker,
 j = transportation mode, and
 V = observable characteristics of utility.
Ben-Akiva et al. claimed that early applications of discrete choice 
analysis used RP surveys, but SP may be used too (39). Each pro-
vides analysis and advice when data are available (a) by considering 
one model for each case and (b) by using a joint estimation method 
for both surveys. Indeed, implementation through a combination 
of RP and SP has been done in different ways, such as by valuing 
environmental amenities, opening new subway lines, or considering 
mode choice (40–42).
In addition, Hensher et al. claimed that the combination of both 
data sources made it possible to estimate models with data not avail-
able in one of the sources available (i.e., an alternative was present 
within the SP component of a data set but not within the RP compo-
nent) (43). Indeed, this situation was considered previously in this 
research, and then field work commenced.
As suggested, the logit model was developed by considering the 
joint estimation of the RP and SP data, because they had comple-
mentary characteristics, and the cross-sectional survey to identify 
factors that otherwise would not have been known. As an illustration, 
to comply with the joint analysis, some researchers such as Hensher 
et al. proposed as a common practice to use a two-level nested logit 
model with one branch, including all RP alternatives, and a second 
branch for the SP alternatives (43). Nested logit models overcome 
problems detected in the single-level multinomial logit formulation 
as the independence of irrelevant alternatives issue. RP and SP utility 
functions are expressed as follows:
RP model:
V + T= β βcost time (2)HSRRP 1 2
SP model:
V T
V T
V T
= β + β + γ
= β + β + γ
= β + β + γ
cost time coach
cost time car
cost time air (3)
coach
SP
1 2 1
SP
car
SP
1 2 2
SP
air
SP
1 2 3
SP
where β is vector of cost and time, and γ is alternative specific attribute, 
or model preference attribute.
The nested logit model reported in Table 2 resulted from a com-
parison of four models, including one that may have had additional 
variables in the model (e.g., income level of the interviewee) and 
the other without these variables. The selected model is described 
later in this paper. The nested logit model parameter estimates were 
obtained with the NLOGIT software and by considering the maxi-
mum likelihood method. For the performance of coefficients, the 
signs and the significance of each parameter were considered.
Overall, the estimated coefficients had the expected signs, because 
they had a negative effect on the utility of an alternative according 
to economic theory. The significance of coefficients was checked 
through the t-statistic significance test (values in brackets). These 
values rejected in most cases the null hypothesis that the coefficient 
was zero with a level of 90% confidence (i.e., p-values). Also, in 
discrete choice models, it is convenient to measure goodness of fit in 
a way analogous to that in linear statistical models. Indeed, the likeli-
hood ratio test—McFadden pseudo-R2 (ρ2)—provides a convenient 
basis to compare different models when more than one alternative 
is being estimated.
Although the pseudo-R2 was analogous to R2 in linear regressions 
(ranged between zero to one), it could not be analyzed in the same 
way and should be used with some caution. In fact, the relationship 
between the indices R2 and pseudo-R2 were provided in Domencich 
and McFadden (36). Within this context, several researchers sug-
gested that pseudo-R2 values tended to be much lower, and a 
pseudo-R2 value of about .2 was good (37, 43–45). Moreover, Ben-
Akiva and Lerman claimed that statistical tests could not be used as 
the only criteria for acceptance or rejection of a model (46).
In addition, the direct and cross-point elasticities in Table 3 were 
reported by applying the NLOGIT effects option. These values 
reflected the relationship between the change of cost of the alter-
native (i.e., HSR) and the change in demand share. For instance, 
given the elasticity on the train alternative, the direct effect was 
−0.58, which meant that under ceteris paribus a 1% increase in train 
cost would decrease the probability that the train alternative would 
be selected by 0.58%. The remaining elasticities represented the 
cross-elasticity effects. As explained, a 1% increase in train cost 
would result in a 0.61% increase in the choice probabilities for the 
selection of coach bus.
With these values, the direct effect of cost elasticity for the train 
was relatively inelastic, whereas the cross-elasticity effects of 
cost on the coach bus, car, and air alternatives would result in 
an increase of their choice probabilities. Similarly, the remaining 
elasticities confirmed expectations: an increase in cost was likely 
to increase the demand for competing goods or services. However, 
despite these unquestionable achievements, cross elasticities were 
nonetheless beset by bias in the survey answers, because the same 
person answered several questions about his or her journey (47).
Any comparison was difficult of the estimation results with those 
in the literature and project studies, because this present research 
focused on the demand changes experienced on Spain’s HSR lines. 
Although the results shown in Table 3 were valid for Spanish HSR 
users, to conduct an accurate comparison, it would be necessary to 
carry out a survey for every type of traveler. Nevertheless, as will 
be explained further on, the elasticities found differed only in their 
order of magnitude but not in the expected sign.
Román et al. conducted a SP and RP survey with 3,143 valid observa-
tions for all types of users in the Madrid–Zaragoza–Barcelona corridor 
(48). The elasticity of HSR services with respect to price was −0.55 
for the Madrid–Zaragoza route and −0.72 for Madrid–Barcelona, 
which was fairly consistent with the results obtained here. The 
cross elasticity of HSR with respect to car use was 0.12 for Madrid–
Zaragoza (0.047 in the present case study), and was 0.7 with respect 
to air services on the Madrid–Barcelona route (0.097) in Table 3 for the 
present case study. Martín and Nombela used a much bigger sample 
of 12,500 travelers on all transport modes to forecast the impact of 
HSR in the whole country (49). Airplane elasticity with respect to 
price was −1.216, and HSR elasticity was −0.432, slightly less than 
in the present study (−1.537 and −0.583, respectively). With respect 
to the elasticities and cross elasticities of the remaining transport 
modes, all had the same sign but were lower than in the present 
research. There are several potential explanations for this outcome, 
such as changed preferences after the economic crisis or a biased 
sample because of the small number of respondents, to name but two.
For some pairs of European cities, Adler et al. found the direct 
elasticities for business users of HSR and air ranked from −0.71 to 
TABLE 2  Logit Model for HSR Services Choice
Variable Alternatives
Coefficient 
Estimate t-Statistic p-Value
Cost, β1 (6) All −0.0212541 (−4.728) .000
Travel time, β2 (min) All −0.0049389 (−1.613) .107
γ1 ASA coach—SP Coach −0.8315303 (−1.018) .309
γ2 ASA car—SP Car −1.7701313 (−1.996) .046
γ3 ASA air—SP Air −1.6246795 (−1.581) .114
Inclusive value RP 1.0000000 Fixed parameter
Inclusive value SP 0.74319539 (3.144) .001
Note: ASA = alternative specific attribute. Summary statistics: number of observations = 220; 
Lˆ (βˆ) = −229.3376; Lˆ (0) = −266.4604; pseudo-R2 = .14.
TABLE 3  Direct and Cross-Point Mode Choice Elasticities 
for HSR Services’ Choice Changing Cost
Transportation Mode HSR Coach Car Air
HSR −0.583 0.608 0.632 0.692
Coach 0.205 −0.662 0.406 0.424
Car 0.047 0.088 −0.480 0.102
Air 0.097 0.169 0.197 −1.537
−0.92 (50). These direct elasticities turned out to be much higher in 
the case of leisure users, with a range from −1.11 to −1.94. Matas 
et al. also pointed out a higher elasticity for leisure than for business 
travelers (51). Therefore, the high elasticities found also could be 
explained by a relatively high proportion of about 53% of leisure 
and family purpose users.
CoNCLuSioNS
To foster the use of HSR and increase the occupancy rates of trains, 
the government of Spain reduced ticket prices by at least 11% and 
at the same time introduced a flexible pricing approach. This study 
analyzed the effects of the new tariff scheme recently implemented 
in the Spanish HSR system. Four main policy lessons arose from 
this research.
First, although users did not choose their travel mode on the basis 
of ticket price alone, price elasticity turned out to be high. In fact, 
price was identified as one of the most important reasons to travel by 
train, along with travel time, comfort, and mode frequency. These 
four factors in conjunction with Renfe Operadora’s punctuality com-
mitment made HSR regarded in Spain as a traveler-friendly mode 
compared with other public transportation modes.
Second, in the Spanish case, this price elasticity in the short term 
could be set at about 0.6, but the effects of the new pricing approach 
would differ and depend on the type of corridor and the competition 
with other modes. In corridors in which HSR was the dominant mode, 
the price elasticity was lower than in corridors in which many travel 
options were available to users. In other words, the larger the num-
ber of travelers and the fiercer the competition was in the corridor, 
the greater the capability of HSR to draw users from other modes 
and to induce additional demand.
Third, in transport systems in which infrastructure manager and 
train operator companies were controlled by the government, the 
implementation of the new tariff approach could harm the rules of 
fair competition between transport modes and introduce perverse 
incentives (e.g., cheaper ticket for the AVE than for the bus), while 
the train operating companies did not cover the total infrastructure 
cost through fees.
Last, HS trains could replace buses and other kind of train services 
and compete with cars for short to medium distances, up to 400 to 
500 km. This capacity also was the case for trips under 2 h. For long- 
distance journeys, competition was mainly with the airplane, whereas 
car use seemed not to be so affected.
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